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Abstract: On 7 Feb 2021, a catastrophic mass flow descended the Ronti Gad, Rishiganga, and 81 
Dhauliganga valleys in Chamoli, Uttarakhand, India, causing widespread devastation and 82 
severely damaging two hydropower projects. Over 200 people were killed or are missing. Our 83 
analysis of satellite imagery, seismic records, numerical model results, and eyewitness videos 84 
reveals that ~27x106 m3 of rock and glacier ice collapsed from the steep north face of Ronti 85 
Peak. The rock and ice avalanche rapidly transformed into an extraordinarily large and mobile 86 
debris flow that transported boulders >20 m in diameter, and scoured the valley walls up to 220 87 
m above the valley floor. The intersection of the hazard cascade with downvalley infrastructure 88 
resulted in a disaster, which highlights key questions about adequate monitoring and sustainable 89 
development in the Himalaya as well as other remote, high-mountain environments. 90 
 91 
One-Sentence Summary: The Chamoli disaster was triggered by an extraordinary rock and ice 92 
avalanche and debris flow, that destroyed infrastructure and left 204 people dead or missing. 93 
	94 
Main	Text: Steep slopes, high topographic relief, and seismic activity make mountain regions 95 
prone to extremely destructive mass movements (e.g. 1). The sensitivity of glaciers and 96 
permafrost to climate changes is exacerbating these hazards (e.g. 2–7). Hazard cascades, where 97 
an initial event causes a downstream chain reaction (e.g. 8), can be particularly far-reaching, 98 
especially when they involve large amounts of water (7, 9, 10). An example is the 1970 99 
Huascarán avalanche, Peru, that was one of the largest, farthest-reaching, and deadliest (~6000 100 
lives lost) mass flows (11). Similarly, in 2013, over 4,000 people died at Kedarnath, 101 
Uttarakhand, India, when a moraine-dammed lake breached following heavy rainfall and 102 
snowmelt (12–14). Between 1894 and 2021, the Uttarakhand Himalaya has witnessed at least 16 103 
major disasters from flash floods, landslides, and earthquakes (14, 15). 104 
Human activities that intersect with the mountain cryosphere can increase risk (16) and are 105 
common in Himalayan valleys where hydropower development is proliferating due to growing 106 
energy demands, the need for economic development, and efforts to transition into a low-carbon 107 
society (17, 18). Hydropower projects in Uttarakhand and elsewhere in the region have been 108 
opposed over their environmental effects, public safety, and issues associated with justice and 109 
rehabilitation (19, 20). 110 
On 7 Feb 2021, a massive rock and ice avalanche from the 6063 m-high Ronti Peak generated a 111 
cascade of events that caused more than 200 deaths or missing persons, as well as damage or 112 
destruction of infrastructure that most notably included two hydropower projects in the 113 
Rishiganga and Dhauliganga valleys (Fig. 1, table S1) (21). Here, we present a rapid and 114 
comprehensive reconstruction of the hazard cascade. We leveraged multiple types of remote 115 
sensing data, eyewitness videos, numerical modeling, seismic data, and reconnaissance field 116 
observations in a collaborative, global effort to understand this event. We also describe the 117 
antecedent conditions and the immediate societal response, allowing us to consider some wider 118 
implications for sustainable development in high-mountain environments. 119 
February 7 2021 hazard cascade 120 
At 4:51 UTC (10:21 Indian Standard Time [IST]), about 26.9x106 m3 (95% confidence interval: 121 
26.5-27.3x106 m3) of rock and ice (Fig. 1, 2) detached from the steep north face of Ronti Peak at 122 
an elevation of about 5,500 m asl, and impacted the Ronti Gad (‘gad’ means rivulet) valley floor 123 
 
 4 
about 1,800 m below. We estimated the onset of this avalanche and its velocity by analyzing 124 
seismic data from two distant stations, 160 and 174 km southeast of the source (Fig. S6) (22, 125 
§5.1). The initial failure happened between 4:51:13 and 4:51:21 UTC, based on a source-sensor 126 
wave travel-time correction. We attributed a high-frequency signal 55 to 58 seconds later to the 127 
impact of the avalanche on the valley bottom, indicating a mean speed of the rock and ice 128 




Fig. 1. Overview of the Chamoli disaster, Uttarakhand, India. (A) 3D rendering of the local 133 
geography, with labels for main place names mentioned in the text. HPP stands for hydropower 134 
project. (B-D) Pre- and post-event satellite imagery of the site of the collapsed rock and glacier 135 
block, and the resulting scar. Note snow cover in the region just before the event (C). The red 136 
arrows in (C) mark the fracture that became the headscarp of the landslide (22, §3.2 and fig. S4). 137 
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The arrow in D points to a remaining part of the lower eastern glacier. (E) 3D rendering of the 138 
scar. (F) Schematic of failed mass of rock and ice. Satellite imagery in (A–D) and (E) is from 139 
Sentinel-2 (Copernicus Sentinel Data 02-10-2021) and Pléiades-HR (© CNES 02-10-2021, 140 







Fig. 2. Satellite-derived elevation data of the Chamoli hazard cascade. (A) Perspective 144 
view of the area, from the landslide source at Ronti Peak to the Rishiganga and Tapovan 145 
Vishnugad hydropower projects (black stars). (B) Elevation change over the landslide scar 146 
based on DEM-differencing between September 2015 and February 10-11, 2021. (C) The 147 
proximal valley floor, with geomorphic interpretations of the flow path. (D) Confluence of 148 
Ronti Gad and Rishiganga River. (E-J) Topographic profiles showing elevation change due to 149 
rock/icefall and sediment deposition for locations shown in (B-D). Elevation loss on the inner 150 
bank in (J) is primarily due to the destruction of forest. 151 
 152 
Differencing of high-resolution digital elevation models (DEMs) revealed a failure scar that 153 
has a vertical difference of up to 180 m and a slope-normal thickness of ~80 m on average, 154 
and a slab width up to ~550 m, including both bedrock and overlying glacier ice (Fig. 2). The 155 
lowermost part of the larger eastern glacier is still in place and was not eroded by the rock and 156 
ice avalanche moving over it (Fig. 1D), suggesting that the avalanche may have become 157 
airborne for a short period during its initial descent. Optical feature tracking detected 158 
movement of the failed rock block as early as 2016, with the largest displacement in the 159 
summer months of 2017 and 2018 (fig. S4). This movement opened a fracture up to 80 m 160 
wide in the glacier and into the underlying bedrock (Fig. 1, fig. S5). Geodetic analysis and 161 
glacier thickness inversions indicate that the collapsed mass comprised ~80% rock and ~20% 162 
glacier ice by volume (22, §5.2, fig. S10). Melt of this ice was essential to the downstream 163 
evolution of the flow, as water transformed the rock and ice avalanche into a highly mobile 164 
debris flow (cf. 23, 24). Media reports (25) suggest that some ice blocks (diameter <1 m) were 165 
found in tunnels at the Tapovan Vishnugad hydropower site (hereafter referred to as the 166 
Tapovan project), and some videos of the debris flow (22, §5.3) show floating blocks that we 167 
interpret as ice, indicating that some of the ice survived at considerable distance downstream. 168 
Notably, and in contrast to most previously documented rock avalanches, very little debris is 169 
preserved at the base of the failed slope. This is likely due to the large volumes of water (22, 170 
§5.5) that resulted in a high mobility of the flow. 171 
 172 
Geomorphic mapping based on very high-resolution satellite images (Table S2) acquired 173 
during and immediately after the event, provides evidence of the flow evolution. We detected 174 
four components of the catastrophic mass flow, beginning with the main rock and ice 175 
avalanche from Ronti Peak described above (component one).  176 
 177 
The second component is “splash deposits” (cf. 26–28), which are relatively fine-grained, wet 178 
sediments that became airborne as the mass flow ran up adjacent slopes. For example, the 179 
rock and ice avalanche traveled up a steep slope on the east side of the valley opposite the 180 
source zone, and some material became airborne, being deposited at a height of about 120 m 181 
above the valley floor. These deposits include boulders up to ~8 m (a-axis length). The bulk of 182 
the flow then traveled back to the proximal (west) side of the valley and rode up a ridge ~220 183 
m above the valley floor, before becoming airborne and splashing into a smaller valley to the 184 
west (Fig. 2C, figs. S15, S18). Boulders up to 13 m (a-axis length) were deposited near the top 185 
of the ridge. Vegetation remained intact on the lee side of some ridges that were overrun by 186 




A third component of the mass flow is reflected in airborne dust deposition. A dust cloud is 189 
visible in PlanetScope imagery from 5:01 UTC and 5:28 UTC February 7 (10:31 and 10:58 190 
IST). A smooth layer of debris, estimated from satellite imagery to be only a few cm in 191 
thickness, was deposited higher than the splash deposits, up to ~500 m above the valley floor, 192 
although the boundary between the airborne dust deposition and other mass flow deposits is 193 
indistinct in places. Signs of the largely airborne splash and dust components can be observed 194 
over ~3.5 km downstream of the valley impact site. The avalanche also generated a powerful 195 
air blast (cf. 1) that flattened about 0.2 km2 of forest on the west side of the Ronti Gad valley 196 
(Fig. 2C).  197 
 198 
After the rock and ice avalanche impacted the valley floor, most of it moved downvalley in a 199 
northwesterly direction. Frictional heating of the ice in the avalanche generated liquid water 200 
that allowed the transition in flow characteristics, becoming more fluid downvalley, creating a 201 
flow consisting of sediment, water, and blocks of ice. The uppermost part of the valley floor 202 
deposits is around 0.75 x106 m3, with remarkably few large boulders that typically form the 203 
upper surface of rock avalanches (e.g. 29, 30) (Fig. 2G, fig. S16). The mass flow traveled 204 
downvalley and superelevated (runup elevation) up to ~130 m above the valley floor around 205 
bends (fig. S17). Clear trimlines, at some places at multiple levels, are evident along much of 206 
the flow path (e.g. Fig. 2C, D).  207 
 208 
At the confluence of the Ronti Gad and Rishiganga River, a ~40 m thick deposit of debris 209 
blocked the Rishiganga valley (Fig. 2H, I). Deposition in this area probably resulted from 210 
deceleration of the mass flow at a sharp turn to the west. During the days following the event, 211 
a lake ~700 m long formed behind these deposits in the Rishiganga valley upstream of its 212 
confluence with Ronti Gad. The lake was still present two months later and had grown since 213 
the initial formation. Substantial deposition occurred about 1 km downstream of the 214 
confluence, where material up to ~100 m thick was deposited on the valley floor (Fig. 2J). 215 
DEM differencing shows that the total deposit volume at the Ronti Gad-Rishiganga River 216 
confluence and just downstream was ~8x106 m3. These large sediment deposits likely indicate 217 
the location where the flow transitioned to a debris flow (31) - the fourth component. 218 
 219 
A field reconnaissance by co-authors from the Wadia Institute of Himalayan Geology 220 
indicates that the impact of debris flow material (sediment, water, ice, woody debris) at the 221 
confluence of Rishiganga River with Dhauliganga River created a bottleneck and forced some 222 
material 150-200 m up the Dhauliganga (fig. S15). The release of the water a few minutes 223 
later led to the destruction of a temple on the north bank of the Dhauliganga. 224 
 225 
A substantial fraction of the fine-grained material involved in the event was transported far 226 
downstream. This more dilute flow could be considered a fifth component. Approximately 24 227 
hours after the initial landslide, the sediment plume was visible in PlanetScope and Sentinel-2 228 
imagery in the hydropower project’s reservoir on the Alaknanda River at Srinagar, about 150 229 
km downstream from the source. About 2½ weeks later, increased turbidity was observed at 230 
Kanpur on the Ganges River, ~900 km from the source. An official of the Delhi water quality 231 
board reported that 8 days after the Chamoli disaster, a chief water source for the city - a canal 232 
drawing directly from the Ganga River - had an unprecedented spike in suspended sediment 233 
(turbidity) 80 times the permissible level (32). The amount of corresponding sedimentation in 234 
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hydropower reservoirs and rivers is unknown, but possibly substantial, and may contribute to 235 
increased erosion on turbine blades, and infilling of reservoirs in the years to come. 236 
 237 
Analysis of eyewitness videos permitted estimation of the propagation of the flow front below 238 
the Ronti Gad-Rishiganga River confluence (Fig. 3, 22, §5.3). The maximum frontal velocity 239 
reconstructed from these videos is ~25 m s-1 near the Rishiganga hydropower project (fig. 240 
S11, table S5), which is about 15 km downstream of the rock and ice avalanche source. Just 241 
upstream of the Tapovan project (another ~10 km downriver), the velocity decreased to ~16 m 242 
s-1, and just downstream of Tapovan (26 km from source), the velocity was ~12 m s-1. The 243 
large reduction in frontal velocity is likely related to impoundment behind the Tapovan 244 
project dam. Analysis of PlanetScope images (at 5:01 UTC and 5:28 UTC) suggests that the 245 
average frontal velocity between Raini (at Rishiganga hydropower project) and Joshimath (16 246 
km downstream) was ~10 m s-1. We also estimated mean discharge from the videos to be 247 
between ~8,200 and ~14,200 m3 s-1 at the Rishiganga hydropower project and between ~2,900 248 
and ~4,900 m3 s-1 downstream of the Tapovan project. Estimates for the debris flow duration 249 
are complicated by uncertain volumes, water contents, discharge amounts, and shapes of 250 
discharge curves at specific locations. For Rishiganga, for example, we estimate a duration 251 
of 10-20 minutes, a number that appears realistic from the information available. 252 
 253 
 254 
Fig. 3. Sample video frames used to analyse flood velocity and discharge. (A,B) Flow 255 
front arrives and rushes through the valley upstream of the Rishiganga project (location P1 in 256 
Fig. 4). (C) Flow front arrives at Tapovan project’s dam (location P3). (D) The reservoir is 257 
being filled quickly; spillways are damaged. (E) The dam is overtopped. (F) Collapse of 258 
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remaining structures. (G-J) Flow front proceeds down the valley below the Tapovan dam 259 
(location P4); spreading into the village in (J).  260 
 261 
We conducted numerical simulations with r.avaflow (22, §5.4), which indicate that the rock 262 
and ice avalanche could not have transitioned to the debris flow seen farther downstream 263 
without an accompanying reduction in the debris volume. If such a direct transition had 264 
occurred, the modeling suggests that the flow discharge would be approximately one order of 265 
magnitude higher than the estimates derived from video recordings (22, §5.4). The deposition 266 
patterns we observed in satellite imagery support the hypothesis that the vicinity of the Ronti 267 
Gad-Rishiganga River confluence played a key role in flow transition. Our numerical 268 
simulations are consistent with the escape of a fluid-rich front from the rock and ice avalanche 269 
mass near this confluence (Fig. 4A), reproducing mapped trimlines and estimated flow 270 
velocities and discharges down to Tapovan (Fig. 4B, C). Our simulated discharge estimates at 271 
P1–P4 are within the ranges derived from the video analysis (Fig. 4D, 22, §5.3), and 272 
simulated travel times between P0-P3 (Fig. 4D) show excellent agreement (<5% difference) 273 
with travel times inferred from seismic data, videos, and satellite imagery. We found less 274 
agreement between the numerical model results and the reconstructions from videos farther 275 
downstream due to the complex effects of the Tapovan project in slowing the flow, which are 276 





Fig. 4. Flow evolution scenarios and simulation. (A) Schematic of the evolution of the flow 280 
from the source to Tapovan. (B) Maximum flow height simulated with r.avaflow, showing the 281 
observed trim lines for comparison. P0 is the location of the velocity estimate derived from 282 
seismic data, P1-P4 are locations of velocity estimates based on videos and satellite images. 283 
(C) Along-profile evolution of flow velocity and fractions of rock/debris, ice, and water 284 
simulated with r.avaflow. (D) Simulated and estimated peak discharges and travel times at 285 
above locations. In the legend labels, (front) refers to the flow front whereas (main) refers to 286 
the point of maximum flow momentum.  287 
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Causes and implications 288 
The February 7 rock and ice avalanche was a very large event with an extraordinarily high fall 289 
height that resulted in a disaster due to its extreme mobility and the presence of downstream 290 
infrastructure. The ~3700 m vertical drop to the Tapovan HPP is surpassed clearly by only 291 
two known events in the historic record, namely the 1962 and 1970 Huascaran avalanches 292 
(11), while its mobility (H/L = 0.16 at Tapovan, where H is fall height and L is flow length) is 293 
exceeded only by a few recent glacier detachments (10). The location of the failure was due to 294 
the extremely steep and high relief of Ronti Peak. The sheared nature of the source rocks and 295 
contrasting interbedded rock types likely conditioned the failure (22, §1). The large and 296 
expanding fracture (Fig 1B, C) at the head scarp may have allowed liquid water to penetrate 297 
into the bedrock, increasing pore-water pressures or enhancing freeze-thaw weathering. 298 
 299 
Nearly all (190) of the 204 people either killed or missing in the disaster (22, §2, Table S1) 300 
were workers at the Rishiganga (13.2 MW) and Tapovan (520 MW) project sites (33). Direct 301 
economic losses from damage to the two hydropower structures alone are over 223 million 302 
USD (34, 35). The high loss of human life and infrastructure damage was due to the debris 303 
flow, and not the initial rock and ice avalanche. However, not all large, high-mountain rock 304 
and ice avalanches transform into highly mobile debris flows that cause destruction far from 305 
their source (9).  306 
 307 
Our energy balance estimates indicate that most of the ~5-6x106 m3 volume of glacier ice first 308 
warmed (along with a portion of the rock mass) from approximately -8ºC to 0ºC and then 309 
melted through frictional heating during the avalanche as it descended to the Rishiganga 310 
valley, involving a drop of approximately 3400 m (22, §5.5). Potential other sources of water 311 
were considered, including glacier lake outburst floods, catastrophic drainage of water from 312 
reservoirs such as surface lakes, ice deposited by earlier avalanches, and enlithic reservoirs. 313 
No evidence for such sources was observed in available remote sensing data. A slow-moving 314 
storm system moved through the area in the days before Feb 7. We estimate that a ~220,000–315 
360,000 m3 contribution from precipitation over the Ronti Gad basin was a minor component 316 
of the flow, representing only 4-7% of the water equivalent contained in the initial glacier ice 317 
detachment. Similarly, while water already present in the river, water ejected from 318 
groundwater, melting snow, wet sediment, and water released from the run-of-the-river 319 
hydroelectric project may have all contributed to the debris flow, even when taken together 320 
(with generous error margins), these sum to a small amount compared to the probable range of 321 
water volumes in the mass movement. The major effect of ice melt on the mobility of rock 322 
and ice avalanches is documented (9, 10), but it appears that the combination of the specific 323 
rock/ice fraction (~80/20% by volume) and large fall height of the rock and ice avalanche led 324 
to a rare, severe event during which nearly all of the ice melted.  325 
 326 
Soon after the disaster, media reports and expert opinions started to circulate, postulating links 327 
of the event to climate change. Recent attribution studies demonstrated that glacier mass 328 
loss on global, regional and local scales is to a large extent attributable to anthropogenic 329 
greenhouse gas forcing (36, 37). High-mountain slope failures in rock and ice, however, 330 
pose additional challenges to attribution due to multiple factors and processes involved in 331 
such events. While long-term trends of increasing slope failure occurrence in some regions 332 
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could be attributed to climate change (16, 38, 39), attribution of single events such as the 333 
Chamoli event remains largely elusive. Nevertheless, certain elements of the Chamoli event 334 
have potential links to climate, and weather, as described below. Furthermore, the Chamoli 335 
event may be seen in the context of a change in geomorphological sensitivity (40) and 336 
might therefore be seen as a precursor for an increase in such events as climate warming 337 
proceeds. 338 
 339 
The stability of glacierized and perennially frozen high-mountain slopes is indeed particularly 340 
sensitive to climate change (16). Our analysis suggests regional climate and related 341 
cryospheric change could have interacted in a complex way with the geologic and topographic 342 
setting to produce this massive slope failure. Air and surface temperatures have been 343 
increasing across the Himalayan region, with greater rates of warming during the second half 344 
of the 20th Century and at higher elevations (41, 42). Most glaciers in the Himalaya are 345 
shrinking and mass loss rates are accelerating across the region (22, §1, 43–46). Glacier 346 
shrinkage uncovers and destabilizes mountain flanks and strongly alters the hydrological and 347 
thermal regimes of the underlying rock. 348 
 349 
The detachment zone at Ronti Peak is about 1 km higher than the regional lower limit of 350 
permafrost at around 4,000 to 4,500 m asl., as indicated by rock glaciers in the region and 351 
global permafrost maps (47, 48). Exposed rock on the north face of Ronti Peak likely contains 352 
cold permafrost with rock temperatures several degrees below 0°C. In connection with 353 
glaciers, however, ground temperatures can be locally higher. The ice-free south face of Ronti 354 
Peak is certainly substantially warmer with rock temperatures perhaps around or above 0°C, 355 
causing strong south-to-north lateral heat fluxes (49). Permafrost temperatures are increasing 356 
worldwide, in particular in cold permafrost (16, 50, 51), leading to long-term and deep-seated 357 
thermal anomalies, and even permafrost degradation (49). Increasing ground temperatures at 358 
the failure site of the Chamoli avalanche could have resulted in reduced strength of the frozen 359 
rock mass by altering the rock hydrology and the mechanical properties of discontinuities and 360 
the failed rock mass (52).  361 
 362 
The geology of the failed rocks includes several observed or inferred critical attributes (22, 363 
§1): (i) The rocks are cut by multiple directions of planar weaknesses; the failed mass 364 
detached along four of these. (ii) The rock mass is close to a major thrust fault, with many 365 
local shear fractures, which - along with other discontinuities - would have facilitated aqueous 366 
chemical weathering. (iii) The rock types (schist and gneiss), even when nominally 367 
unweathered, contain abundant soft, platy, oriented, and geomechanically anisotropic minerals 368 
(phyllosilicates and kyanite especially); Weathering will further weaken these rocks, and they 369 
will be more likely to disintegrate into fine material upon impact, which would influence the 370 
rheology and likely enhance the mobility of the mass flow.    371 
 372 
Importantly, the 7 Feb failure considerably changed the stress regime and thermal conditions 373 
in the area of the detachment zone. Only detailed investigations and monitoring will 374 
determine whether rock or ice adjacent to the failed block (including a large hanging rock 375 
block above the scarp) were destabilized due to these changes and present an ongoing hazard. 376 
Similarly, the impoundment at the Ronti Gad-Rishiganga River confluence requires careful 377 
monitoring as embedded ice in the dam deposits may melt with warmer temperatures, 378 
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increasing the risk of an outburst flood by reducing lake freeboard of the dam, and/or reducing 379 
structural coherence of the dam. 380 
 381 
Videos of the event, including the ones broadcast on social media in real time (22, §5.3), 382 
showed that the people directly at risk had little to no warning. This leads us to question what 383 
could have happened if a warning system had been installed. We estimate that a suitably 384 
designed early warning system might have allowed for 6 to 10 minutes of warning before the 385 
arrival of the debris flow at the Tapovan project (perhaps up to 20 minutes if situated near the 386 
landslide source, or if a dense seismic network was leveraged (53)), which may have provided 387 
enough time to evacuate at least some workers from the power project. After the event, a new 388 
flood warning system was installed near Raini (22, §2.1, fig. S15D). Studies show that early 389 
warning system design and installation is technically feasible but rapid communication of 390 
reliable warnings and appropriate responses by individuals to alerts, are complex (54). 391 
Previous research indicates that effective early warning requires public education, including 392 
drills, which would increase awareness of potential hazards and improve ability to take action 393 
when disaster strikes (55, 56). Considering the repeated failures from the same slope in the 394 
past two decades (22, §1), public education and drills in the Chamoli region would be very 395 
beneficial.  396 
Conclusions 397 
On the morning of 7 Feb 2021, a large rock and ice avalanche descended the Ronti Gad 398 
valley, rapidly transforming into a highly mobile debris flow that destroyed two hydropower 399 
plants and left more than 200 people dead or missing. We identified three primary drivers for 400 
the severity of the Chamoli disaster: (1) the extraordinary fall height, providing ample 401 
gravitational potential energy; (2) the worst-case rock:ice ratio, which resulted in almost 402 
complete melting of the glacier ice, enhancing the mobility of the debris flow; and (3) the 403 
unfortunate location of multiple hydropower plants in the direct path of the flow. 404 
The debris flow disaster started as a wedge failure sourced in bedrock near the crest of Ronti 405 
Peak, and included an overlying hanging glacier. The rock almost completely disintegrated in 406 
the ~1 minute that the wedge took to fall (~5500 – 3,700 m asl), and the rock:ice ratio of the 407 
detached mass was almost exactly the critical value required for near-complete melting of the 408 
ice. As well as having a previous history of large mass movements, the mountain is riven with 409 
planes and points of structural weakness, and further bedrock failures as well as large ice and 410 
snow avalanches are inevitable. 411 
Videos of the disaster were rapidly distributed through social media, attracting widespread 412 
international media coverage and catalyzing an immediate response from the international 413 
scientific community. This response effort quickly leveraged images from modern 414 
commercial and civilian government satellite constellations that offer exceptional resolution, 415 
"always-on" cadence, rapid tasking, and global coverage. This event demonstrated that if 416 
appropriate human resources and technologies are in place, post-disaster analysis can be 417 
reduced to days or hours. Nevertheless, ground-based evidence remains crucial for clarifying 418 
the nature of such disasters.  419 
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Although we cannot attribute this individual disaster specifically to climate change, the 420 
possibly increasing frequency of high-mountain slope instabilities can likely be related to 421 
observed atmospheric warming and corresponding long-term changes in cryospheric 422 
conditions (glaciers, permafrost). Multiple factors beyond those listed above contributed to the 423 
Chamoli rock and ice avalanche, including the geologic structure and steep topography, 424 
possible long-term thermal disturbances in permafrost bedrock induced by atmospheric 425 
warming, stress changes due to the decline and collapse of adjacent and overlying glaciers, 426 
and enhanced melt water infiltration during warm periods.  427 
The Chamoli event also raises important questions about clean energy development, climate 428 
change adaptation, disaster governance, conservation, environmental justice, and sustainable 429 
development in the Himalaya and other high-mountain environments. This stresses the 430 
importance of a better understanding of the cause and impact of mountain hazards, leading to 431 
disasters. While the scientific aspects of this event are the focus of our study, we cannot 432 
ignore the human suffering and emerging socio-economic impacts that it caused. It was the 433 
human tragedy that motivated the authors to examine available data and explore how these 434 
data, analyses, and interpretations can be used to help inform decision-making at the ground 435 
level. 436 
The disaster tragically revealed the risks associated with the rapid expansion of hydropower 437 
infrastructure into increasingly unstable territory. Enhancing inclusive dialogues among 438 
governments, local stakeholders and communities, private sector, and the scientific 439 
community could help assess, minimize, and prepare for existing risks. The disaster indicates 440 
that the long-term sustainability of planned hydroelectric power projects must account for 441 
both current and future social and environmental conditions, while mitigating risks to 442 
infrastructure, personnel, and downstream communities. Conservation values carry elevated 443 
weight in development policies and infrastructure investments where the needs for social and 444 
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Supplementary Text  967 
1. Study Site  968 
Ronti Peak (6063 m asl) is located in the Nanda Devi Biosphere Reserve, which is amongst 969 
UNESCO's world network of Biosphere Reserves, and is in the northern Indian state of 970 
Uttarakhand (Fig. 1). The failure zone is within the Reserve’s Core Zone, and the impacted 971 
people and infrastructure - in Raini and Tapovan villages - are within the Buffer Zone (63). 972 
 973 
Geology: The landslide originated in the Joshimath Formation, a basal unit of the Vaikrita 974 
Group (64), which is the hanging wall of the Vaikrita Thrust fault (65). The Joshimath 975 
Formation consists of high-grade metamorphic rocks, including Precambrian upper 976 
amphibolite facies (66), largely psammitic schist and gneiss derived from former impure 977 
sandstone. The failure appears to be a bedrock wedge failure, which normally takes place 978 
along intersecting rock type or structural discontinuities (67, 68). The failure appears to 979 
involve four distinct planar surfaces: the vertical back wall, the detachment surface base, and 980 
two lateral intersecting planes. The four surfaces might consist of any combination of bedding 981 
planes, foliation, fault planes, and joints (fractures).  982 
 983 
High-resolution satellite images of the ice-free south face of Ronti Peak show numerous shear 984 
fractures, in addition to stratification or foliation of the metamorphic rocks. The Vaikrita 985 
Thrust (69) nominally is 1-2 km west of the failure site. However, the mapped fault is an 986 
approximation. With the rugged topography and shallow fault plane dip, the actual surface 987 
trace has a complex geometry. This thrust fault must also exist less than 1 km beneath Ronti 988 
Peak. Activity on the fault mostly ceased in the Miocene or earlier (65, 70). The primary 989 
ongoing seismicity, such as the 1999 Chamoli earthquake, stems from movement associated 990 
with the Main Himalayan Thrust, about 16 km beneath the Chamoli area (71). The influence 991 
of erosion on this rock sequence is evident in high-resolution satellite images, which show a 992 
very rugged relief on the sheared, bedded rocks. This combination of steep slopes, high relief, 993 
and faulted and jointed bedded/foliated rocks - including mechanically contrasting rocks 994 
juxtaposed on planar contacts - is associated with failures of the greatest magnitude (72). An 995 
implied high abundance of platy minerals (e.g., muscovite and biotite) and other fine-grained 996 
minerals, and possible chemical weathering, may have made these rocks more prone to 997 
disintegration, perhaps contributing to the dynamics of the mass movement.  998 
 999 
Climatology: The area is dominated by western disturbances in the winter and the Indian 1000 
monsoon during summer, with most precipitation falling between June and September.  1001 
The long term mean based on downscaled ERA-5 shows that near-surface air temperatures at 1002 
the height of the detachment are sub-freezing for most of the year (fig. S1A). ERA5 data 1003 
further show a temperature increase of 0.18 °C per decade since 1979 (fig. S1B). A long-term 1004 
increase in air temperature can also be seen in data from a weather station ~100 km south of 1005 
Ronti Peak (fig. S1C). The late monsoon and post-monsoon season 2020 stand out from the 1006 
long term ERA5 record as particularly warm months before returning to more average 1007 
conditions early winter. Above-freezing temperatures at the elevation of the failure may have 1008 
provided additional meltwater and contributed to increased freeze-thaw action during the 1009 




Fig. S1. Historical climate trends. (A) Long-term mean annual cycle of near surface air 1012 
temperature at the location of the failure as compared to the year 2020 from downscaled 1013 
ERA5 data using the TopoSCALE scheme (73). (B) Local mean annual air temperature 1014 
(MAAT) at the elevation of the failure and (C) Temperature deviations from the long-term 1015 
mean at an automated weather station at Mukteswar, Kumaon, about 100 km south of Ronti 1016 




The numerous glaciers in the region are experiencing mass loss, with both thinning and retreat 1021 
(74, 75), in large part due to the long-term warming trend (76). Geodetic mass balance data 1022 
derived from recent and historical stereo-imagery (44, 45, 77) were updated and compiled in 1023 
the present study for Uttarakhand state. The results show that the glacier mass balance rate 1024 
across Uttarakhand was -0.26 ±0.12 m w.e. yr-1 for the period 1975-2000 and has been ~25% 1025 
more negative during the period 2000-2018. Regionally, the lower boundary of permafrost is 1026 
likely between 4000 and 4500 m asl (47, 78). For steep topography, however, the permafrost 1027 
distribution is crucially influenced by solar radiation. Gruber et al. (4) state that south faces in 1028 
central and eastern Hindu Kush Himalaya can be permafrost-free up to well above 6000 m asl. 1029 
The north face of Ronti Peak supports several small hanging glaciers, and the one just west of 1030 
the failure zone produced large ice avalanches (several million m3) in the years 2000 and 2016 1031 
(fig. S2).  1032 
2. Social and Economic Impacts  1033 
At least 204 people are confirmed dead or remain missing. Complicated rescue efforts 1034 
involved the use of heavy machinery to search for an estimated 35 people in a large tunnel 1035 
under construction for the Tapovan project (33). The primary economic cost of the disaster 1036 
includes over 206 million USD from damage to the 520 MW Tapovan project (34). Losses at 1037 
the smaller 13.2 MW Rishiganga project are estimated to be at least 17.2 million USD (35). 1038 
NTPC Limited (79) has pledged financial compensation to the families of workers who were 1039 
killed, and government agencies pledged compensation for all the killed or injured. Linear 1040 
infrastructure damage includes six bridges (33) (e.g. fig S15D). The full economic losses are 1041 
yet to be publicly reported.  1042 
 1043 
2.1 Warning systems 1044 
After the recent event, a flood warning system was installed 400 m upstream of Raini village 1045 
(80), primarily to warn of any outburst from a newly formed landslide-dammed lake in the 1046 
Rishiganga valley (fig. S15D). Unlike glacial lake outburst floods, there is far less certainty in 1047 
assessing the risk from a hazard cascade like the February 7 event, especially in the event of 1048 
failure of a secondary landslide-dammed lake (81, 82). The rapidity of this event means that 1049 
even if such a system had been in place upstream, the warning time would only have been 6-1050 
10 minutes, or perhaps up to 20 minutes if the system were installed near the mountain peaks, 1051 
where a continuing hazard may exist. This would have potentially been enough time that some 1052 
of those who were killed or injured could have moved to safe ground. While such systems are 1053 
relatively easy to install, disseminating reliable warnings to people who would respond 1054 
appropriately is a complex endeavor (54). Pollock and Wartman (56) argue that human 1055 
behavior is the most significant factor in landslide mortality. Early warning systems, drills, 1056 




and public education campaigns for workers and residents are critical for success (55). 1057 
Furthermore, in the case of tunnel-based infrastructure, such as that at the Tapovan project, 1058 
effective warnings would have to be transmitted to workers inside the tunnels, and a means of 1059 
rapid escape incorporated in the tunnel designs to markedly reduce a repeat of this disaster’s 1060 
human toll. 1061 
 1062 
2.2 Conservation-development dilemma 1063 
The disaster has returned focus on the Raini village and its famous Chipko Movement, with 1064 
the media reminiscing the village’s struggle for conservation and assertion of residents’ rights 1065 
to their forests (83). Raini, in Uttarakhand’s Chamoli district, was the first settlement to be 1066 
greatly impacted by the mass flow. The village includes two settlements on opposite sides of 1067 
the Rishiganga River—Raini Chak Subhai, and Raini Chak Lata. Between them is the 1068 
Rishiganga hydropower project, where 53 people were either killed or remain missing because 1069 
of the disaster. The village is important in the history of environmental social movements, 1070 
because in March 1974, women from Raini, led by Gaura Devi, drove away tree fellers 1071 
engaged in commercial forestry (84). The Chipko Movement is named after residents hugging 1072 
trees to save them from being cut (‘chipko’ in Hindi means to cling or hug). The movement, 1073 
which started in 1973, and witnessed an important manifestation in Raini in 1974, spread 1074 
across the Garhwal and Kumaon Himalaya. The awareness it created was key to the creation 1075 
of India’s Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (85). However, Raini’s battle for conservation 1076 
continues, as its citizens were in the Uttarakhand High Court as recently as April 2019, for an 1077 
alleged violation of their rights by the Rishiganga project developers, regarding dumping of 1078 
waste in the river, the use of explosives, and illegal mining (20). 1079 
 1080 
At least 16 major disasters from floods due to heavy rain or glacial lake outburst floods, 1081 
landslides, and earthquakes have occurred in the Garhwal and Kumaon Himalaya in 1082 
Uttarakhand between 1894 and 2021(14, 15). Environmental conservation is an essential 1083 
component when studying such disasters. A 1970 flood in the Alaknanda catchment, of which 1084 
Raini is a part, killed 55 people (85). Studies concluded that deforestation was one of the 1085 
reasons for the massive sediment load brought down in the flood (84, 86). Raini’s struggle 1086 
against floods continues; the Rishiganga project, which was damaged by flooding in 2013 and 1087 
2016, is now completely destroyed (35).  1088 
The Chamoli disaster has returned attention to large infrastructure projects, including dams 1089 
(87, 88) and tunnels. Past studies provide some perspective on hydropower development in 1090 
Uttarakhand. An Expert Body was formed at the behest of the Supreme Court of India after a 1091 
rainfall-induced disaster in June 2013 killed over 4000 people, and damaged much 1092 
infrastructure, including hydropower projects (12, 89). The Expert Body’s report (89) 1093 
documented how hydropower projects had exacerbated the 2013 disaster. Sediment dumping 1094 
and the use of explosives by dam construction companies were specifically mentioned as 1095 
causing harm to the fragile Himalayan environment. The report mentions at least three 1096 
environmental concerns with respect to the Tapovan Vishnugad project, which was damaged 1097 
in the recent disaster. First, the project, which is located in the Buffer Zone of the Nanda Devi 1098 
Biosphere Reserve, poses a potential threat to the region’s biodiversity and habitats. Second, 1099 
sediment disposal was mismanaged at the dam site. Third, on December 24, 2009, tunneling 1100 
intersected an aquifer and discharged at least 60 million litres of water, daily, for over one 1101 
month (90). The project was also damaged in the 2012, 2013 and 2016 floods (91, 92). 1102 
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Additionally, there has been public discontent regarding the lack of community participation 1103 
in the decision-making process for the project (19). The importance of seeking public opinion 1104 
in hydropower projects in the Himalaya has been stressed by Grönwall (93). 1105 
Seismicity is an important consideration when locating and constructing hydropower projects 1106 
in the Himalaya as many Himalayan regions, including Uttarakhand, India, are vulnerable to 1107 
large earthquakes (94, 95). The Mw 7.8 Gorkha earthquake in Nepal in 2015 damaged 16 1108 
hydropower projects with a total installed capacity of 270 MW (95). Several hydropower 1109 
projects in the Himalaya are in the planning stage and need to take seismicity into 1110 
consideration, including the proposed 5040 MW Pancheshwar project on the Mahakali River 1111 
between Uttarakhand, India and westernmost Nepal (96). Especially important, in our view, is 1112 
to consider seismically triggered hazards cascades and the potential for long-runout events 1113 
such as experienced in Chamoli. 1114 
Data from 2013 show that the Uttarakhand government was planning 450 hydropower 1115 
projects with a combined generating capacity of 27039 MW (89). Of those, 92 projects (3624 1116 
MW) had been commissioned at that time, 38 (3292 MW) were under construction, and 320 1117 
(20123 MW) were either awaiting approval or undergoing surveys (89). However, an ongoing 1118 
case in the Supreme Court of India has slowed dam construction in the state. In a series of 1119 
court cases and filings, the Uttarakhand government has argued about revenue loss (~618 1120 
million USD) from delays in hydropower development and reductions in generating capacity 1121 
of operational hydropower projects due to existing norms (97–99). However, a counter-1122 
argument may have been made by the tragic disaster in 2021. 1123 
In sum, it is apparent that tension between conservation and resistance to development on one 1124 
hand, and pressures to develop on the other hand are very alive in Uttarakhand and other 1125 
Himalayan states. Wide-ranging Earth-system hazards have been displayed intensively in 1126 
repeated disasters in the Himalaya (100, 101). At the same time, India is seeking, as is the rest 1127 
of the world, to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, and hydropower is an obvious choice for 1128 
doing this. The tension thus will not disappear; the question is how to balance the needs. 1129 
3. Antecedent conditions 1130 
3.1 Past events 1131 
The north face of Ronti Peak has been the site of mass failures in recent decades, although 1132 
most involved only hanging glacier ice (cf. 102). The first event that we catalogued using 1133 
Landsat 7 data occurred between January 3 and April 8, 2000, when part of the hanging 1134 
glacier (~0.16 km2) collapsed from an elevation of ~5300 m and descended to the Ronti Gad 1135 
valley (fig. S2). The ice mass traveled a distance of about 6 km and impacted an area of ~0.7 1136 
km2 on the valley floor. By 2003, the icy avalanche deposits in the valley had mostly melted.  1137 
 1138 
The second event occurred between September 19 and October 3, 2016 based on Sentinel-2 1139 
and Planet Labs imagery, and involved the same hanging glacier, which had reformed since 1140 
2000 (fig. S2, S3, S5). The glacier again collapsed (~0.2 km2 source area) from about the 1141 
same elevation, impacted the valley to a distance of ~6.5 km from the source, and had an 1142 
almost identical area to that of the 2000 event. These avalanche deposits had almost entirely 1143 




3.2 Precursory motion 1146 
We calculated precursory slope motion using optical feature tracking model GIV (103, 104). 1147 
Displacements were calculated across 11012 pairs of Sentinel-2 images, spanning the period 1148 
from November 2015 to February 2021, and processed into monthly mean velocity maps. We 1149 
observed over 10 m of slip in the vicinity of the 2021 landslide in the five years that preceded 1150 
the catastrophic slope failure. There were particularly rapid episodes of slip in the summers of 1151 
2017 and 2018 (fig. S4), with displacements of >5 m a-1 even in areas of bare bedrock (see 1152 
also fig. S5). 1153 
 1154 
Fig. S5. High-resolution orthoimages over source area. Image sequence includes 1155 
Maxar/DigitalGlobe WorldView-1/2 (PAN, 0.5 m), ISRO/NRSC CartoSat-1 (PAN, 2.5 m), 1156 
Planet Dove Classic (NIR, ~3-4 m) and CNES/Airbus Pleiades-HR (PAN, 0.5 m) imagery. 1157 
See Table S2 for more details. All images except September 10, 2015 were enhanced using a 1158 
Contrast Limited Adaptive Histogram Equalisation (CLAHE) algorithm implemented in the 1159 
scikit-image package v0.17.1 (105; clip limit 0.05, kernel size of 500 px for <1 m GSD imagery, 1160 
125 px for others) to bring out detail over both light (e.g., ice/snow) and dark (e.g., exposed 1161 
rock) surfaces. The large fracture associated with the February 7, 2021 event is apparent in the 1162 
October 19, 2017 image, with increased width in the November 1, 2018 image. Limited 1163 
expansion is observed in subsequent images. The 2021 images show stratigraphy exposed in 1164 
the west wall of the scar, and deposits from small rockfall events following the large February 1165 
7, 2021 collapse. These orthoimages were derived from Level-1B imagery that is © 1166 
Maxar/Digitalglobe, Inc. (NGA NextView License), ISRO/NRSC, Planet Labs, Inc., and 1167 
CNES/Airbus DS. Pre-event images were orthorectified using the September 2015 DEM 1168 
Composite (60), post-event images were orthorectified using the February 2021 DEM 1169 
Composite (61). 1170 
 1171 
Materials and Methods 1172 
4. Materials 1173 
We used multiple stereo observations from very high resolution (DigitalGlobe/Maxar 1174 
GeoEye-1 and WorldView-1/2/3, CNES/Airbus Pleiades-HR, and Planet SkySat-C, all 0.3-0.7 1175 
m GSD) and high-resolution (Airbus SPOT-7, 1.5 m GSD; Cartosat-1, 2.5 m GSD) satellite 1176 
imagery to produce a time-series of DEMs between 2015 and 2021 (table S2). While several 1177 
of the satellite images listed in Table S2 were acquired as in-track stereo pairs by the same 1178 
sensor, we also formed several additional cross-track stereo pairs from monoscopic images 1179 
acquired within a few days by different sensors on different orbits. All DEMs were generated 1180 
using the open-source NASA Ames Stereo Pipeline (106, 107), with processing details for the 1181 
September 2015 pre-event and February 2021 post-event DEM composites described in 1182 
Bhushan and Shean (60) and Shean et al. (61), respectively. We used similar processing 1183 
parameters to derive a DEM from the December 24, 2018 SPOT-7 stereo pair (108). 1184 
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5. Methods 1185 
5.1 Seismological analysis 1186 
We analyzed continuous seismic data from two stations (Bayana - noted BAYN - and 1187 
Ghanteshwar - noted GHAN) of the Nepalese seismic network (DMG/NEMRC) for the days 1188 
February 6, 2021 and February 07, 2021 (109). BAYN is a short period (<2 s) ZM500 vertical 1189 
sensor. GHAN is a 3-component broadband velocimeter. Sampling frequencies of these 1190 
signals are 50 Hz. Goals of the seismic data analysis were to detect any potential events prior 1191 
to the main flow, characterize the onset time of the rockslide, and constrain the velocity of the 1192 
flow at its initiation. 1193 
  1194 
We first detected all events recorded simultaneously by the two sensors (locations shown in 1195 
fig. S6E) by calculating the peaks in the spectrogram stacked in the frequency range 0.5 – 20 1196 
Hz, as a function of time. An event is identified when this function exceeds 3. All the peaks 1197 
separated by less than 20 seconds are considered to be part of the same event. This procedure 1198 
leads to the detection of two local earthquakes (February 6, 2021 at 17:43, February 7, 2021 at 1199 
09:22, UTC), one a Mw3 earthquake located east of Kathmandu (February 7, 2021 04:31, 1200 
UTC) and characterized by impulsive onsets and clear P- and S-wave arrivals. This detection 1201 
clearly identified the Chamoli rock and ice avalanche (February 7, 2021 04:52), with clear 1202 
triangular asymmetrical shapes on the spectrogram of about 5 minutes (fig. S6A-C), typical of 1203 
large rockslide sources (110, 111). The main frequency content is below 15 Hz and is 1204 
followed by a long coda of at least 10 minutes (see fig. S6 and table S3), with frequency 1205 
content below 5 Hz. This unusual long tail suggests the source of this signal is generated by a 1206 
succession of a rock slope failure followed by a long duration flow. 1207 
 1208 
This detection procedure suggests that no earthquakes dynamically triggered the rock slope 1209 
failure, and that the block detached in one piece, or at least that the major part of the block 1210 
detached in this event. 1211 
 1212 
The BAYN signal shows an impulsive onset (fig. S6D), with a clear first signal, different in 1213 
terms of amplitude and frequency from the seismic noise. Such a first pulse is not seen on the 1214 
GHAN records due to higher noise of the traces. We therefore interpret this first signal as the 1215 
detachment phase of the failure, also previously observed with other rockfalls or rockslides 1216 
(112–114) and created either by elastic rebound of the cliff, fracture opening, or friction 1217 
between the detached compartment and the cliff. Therefore, this signal gives a clear time 1218 
constraint of the event onset, with a 2s uncertainty depending on the physical origin of this 1219 
signal. In the case of the fracture opening hypothesis, a small time delay can exist between 1220 
this signal and the avalanche initiation. The 2s uncertainty is estimated through the length of 1221 
the detachment signal. 1222 
 1223 
We corrected this onset time from the wave propagation travel time between source and 1224 
station by estimating the P-wave apparent velocity through correlation of the two 1225 
spectrograms at stations BAYN and GHAN. The time-shift between the two signal envelopes 1226 
is estimated by maximizing the correlation between the two seismic envelopes as a function of 1227 
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a time-shift (115), leading to a value between 2.56 and 2.05 seconds, depending on whether 1228 
the raw correlation function or a mathematical fit is used. Given the slight distance difference 1229 
between the two stations and the event (Table 1), this time-shift provides mean wave apparent 1230 
velocities between 5.8 and 7.2 km s-1. These values are consistent with P-wave velocity 1231 
estimates of the crust and upper mantle in the high Himalaya (116, 117) and show that P-wave 1232 
dominates the high-frequency content of the signal. The wave propagation travel-time is 1233 
consequently estimated at between 24.2 and 30.0 seconds at station BAYN, providing an 1234 
onset time of the rockslide detachment between 4:51:13 and 04:51:21 UTC, including the 1235 
error on the physical origin of the detachment signal. 1236 
 1237 
The two spectrograms are very well correlated (fig. S6A), including several high-frequency 1238 
peaks created by impacts of the flow on valley flanks, turns, and changes of slope gradient. 1239 
The first major peak occurs 55 to 58 seconds after detachment (fig. S6A, B). 1240 
 1241 
Given the topographic profile of the initial slope, with no large depressions, bumps, or major 1242 
turns, this signal certainly comes from the impact of the flow on the northeastern flank of the 1243 
valley. This analysis allows us to calculate the velocity of the avalanche as it descends from 1244 
the detachment scar to the valley floor, an average speed of 57 to 60 m s-1 (205 to 216 km h-1). 1245 
 1246 
5.2 Estimation of volume and rock:ice ratio 1247 
The volume and ratio of rock and ice involved in the failure are key to understanding the 1248 
exceptional downstream mobility of the mass flow. We assess the volume of each 1249 
contribution using pre- and post-event digital elevation models (61, 61) and estimates of ice 1250 
thickness from our own inversion based on glacier flow velocity and Farinotti et al. (118). 1251 
We account for the following uncertainties: 1252 
1.  DEM vertical uncertainty 1253 
2.  Collapse area lateral extent 1254 
3.  Ice thickness 1255 
1) Collapse volume calculations are based on the difference between pre- and post- event 1256 
DEMs. The relevant vertical uncertainty is thus the summed uncertainties in the two maps. To 1257 
evaluate this, we fit a gaussian peak to the difference map in areas with elevations that are 1258 
known to have not changed (bedrock on the south face of the Ronti ridge). The histogram of 1259 
stable ground is shown in fig. S7. This histogram can be fit with a gaussian peak with a mean 1260 
of (+) 0.33 m and a standard deviation of 0.64 m. We use this to estimate the two-sigma DEM 1261 
differencing uncertainty as 1.28 m. 1262 
2) We evaluate the uncertainty in collapse area lateral extent by using two contours in the 1263 
DEM difference map: the -5 m contour and 0 m contour. In theory, if all else is stable, the 0 m 1264 
contour would delineate the lateral extent of the collapse scar. Visual estimation, however, 1265 
suggests that this is an overestimate, likely due to snow and to ice thickness changes between 1266 
the 2015 pre-event DEM and the landslide date, and DEM uncertainty. We thus consider the 0 1267 
m contour as a maximum bound for the collapse area and -5 m contour as the minimum bound 1268 
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(shown in fig. S8). Comparison to pre-event imagery shows that 75% of the region between 1269 
the 0 and -5 m contours is covered with ice, the remainder being bedrock. We calculate the 1270 
volume of material removed in this area by differencing the pre- and post-event DEMs. 1271 
3) We evaluate uncertainties in ice thickness based on two sources: four glacier thickness 1272 
maps from Farinotti et al. (118) (methods 1-4), and an additional inversion based on glacier 1273 
surface velocity. For each, we calculate the total ice volume over the collapse area. The result 1274 
of this analysis is shown in fig. S9. The volume calculated from the velocity-based inversion 1275 
is 5.38 Mm3 of ice (95% confidence intervals 4.82-6.35 Mm3), with volumes of 6.69, 5.08, 1276 
4.57 and 4.13 Mm3 calculated using the Farinotti et al. (118) methods 1-4, respectively. We 1277 
average the four Farinotti et al. (118) ice volume estimates, and assign the composite a 20% 1278 
(two-sigma) uncertainty. Uncertainties in ice velocity and inversion parameters are already 1279 
accounted for in the ice velocity-based inversion. These volume estimates do not include the 1280 
area between the 0 and -5 m contours, which is estimated separately. 1281 
We then calculate the total landslide volume (VT), volume of rock (VR), and rock percentage 1282 
(RR) using the three following equations: 1283 
𝑉! = (𝐷𝐸𝑀1(#$) − 𝐷𝐸𝑀2(#$) 	±	𝑈!) ∗ 𝐴(#$)     (1) 1284 




          (3) 1286 
where DEM1 and DEM2 are the 2015 and 2021 DEMs within difference contour level x, A is 1287 
the area of the collapse within contour level x, x is a number selected from a uniform 1288 
distribution between 0 and -5 (accounting for uncertainty in collapse area lateral extent),  UT 1289 
is a DEM difference uncertainty term (randomly selected from a normal distribution with two 1290 
standard deviations equal to 1.28 m), and VI is the ice volume selected randomly from the 1291 
either the Farinotti et al. (118) composite or ice velocity-based inversion (in both cases, 1292 
accounting for uncertainties). Uncertainties are handled using a Bayesian approach, with 1293 
100,000 runs. 1294 
The results are shown in fig. S10. In summary, we have: 1295 
● A total landslide volume of 26.9 Mm3 [95% confidence intervals (CI) 26.5-27.3 Mm3] 1296 
● A volume of rock of 21.4 Mm3 [95% CI 20.4-22.2 Mm3] 1297 
● An ice volume of 5.5 Mm3 [95% CI 4.7-6.4 Mm3] 1298 
● A rock percentage in the collapse of 79% [95% CI 76-82%] 1299 
 1300 
5.3 Insights into flow characteristics and timing from eyewitness videos 1301 
We explored available eyewitness videos published on Facebook and YouTube and searched 1302 
for videos capturing the arrival of the flow front at different locations along the flow path 1303 




Analysis of flow-front velocity and discharge involved three steps: (1) the location of the 1306 
camera and viewed scene were determined based on identifiable buildings, bridges, roads,  1307 
and geomorphic features (ridges, rills, boulders) with cross-validation provided by high-1308 
resolution satellite images and field photos; (2) mean flow velocity (v) was estimated as a 1309 
quotient of flow travel distance (Δd) and time (Δt) (v = Δd/Δt); Δd was determined from high-1310 
resolution satellite images (streamline distance), and Δt was derived from the videos (table 1311 
S4); (3) mean discharge of the flow front was calculated as a product of the mean flow 1312 
velocity (v) and cross-profile area of the flow (A); A was approximated by the area of an 1313 
idealized trapezoid with the underside of the trapezoid taken to be the mean active channel 1314 
width along the analyzed section of the stream, and 45° and 60° the stream bank steepness. 1315 
The depth for calculating cross-sectional area was approximated from eyewitness videos 1316 
where appropriate (e.g. where buildings located on the banks gave sense of scale). Where this 1317 
was not appropriate, we measured pre- and post-event channel width (bottom and top side of 1318 
idealized trapezoid) and approximated depth by assuming side inclination of 45° to 60°. This 1319 
resulted in mean flow depths ranging from 7 to 13 m. We did not use mapped trimlines to 1320 
estimate flow depths for approximating A because of potential major overestimation caused 1321 
by unsteady flow character and upslope runup. The outcomes of steps (1) and (2) are 1322 
generally reliable; step (3) has the largest uncertainty, mainly resulting from the estimation of 1323 
A. 1324 
 1325 
The timing of the flow front arrival at specific locations (absolute timing T) was determined 1326 
using: (1) times of videos streamed live on Facebook; and (2) metadata of selected videos 1327 
provided by the authors. Further, we approximated times of the flow front arrival at a variety 1328 
of locations along the streamline from T and estimated flow front velocities v. 1329 
We estimated flow front velocity at four sites, P1 to P4, located 14.3 to 25.7 km downstream 1330 
from the source (fig. S11, table S5). The absolute time of the flow front arrival is only known 1331 
for the Tapovan site, where the flow front appeared at 10:38 – 10:39.  1332 
 1333 
5.4 Simulation of the flow evolution with r.avaflow 1334 
Computer simulations were performed to test the plausibility of initial hypotheses of flow 1335 
evolution, with the aim of rejecting some hypotheses and therefore better constraining viable 1336 
mechanisms. The open-source GIS-based mass flow simulation tool r.avaflow was used for 1337 
the simulations (120, 121). The multi-phase model of Pudasaini and Mergili (122) was used to 1338 
simulate the process chain from the release of the initial rock/ice avalanche to location P4, 1339 
with two solid phases (rock, ice including some till) and one fluid phase (water and fine mud). 1340 
The ice phase was transformed to fluid at a rate proportional to the flow kinetic energy. Initial 1341 
conditions were given by the DEM, the release mass (21.4x106 m³ of rock and 5.5x106 m² of 1342 
ice), and different amounts of entrainable material (debris, snow assumed to melt 1343 
immediately, and/or soil water), depending on the scenario. The flow parameters were 1344 
optimized based on empirical data (trimlines to check flow extent, reconstructed peak 1345 
discharges, frontal velocities, and travel times). Four zones with specific parameter sets were 1346 
defined along the flow path: initial rock/ice avalanche, Ronti Gad, Rishiganga, and 1347 
Dhauliganga (fig. S12). We note that the simulation mainly aimed to reproduce the frontal 1348 
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part of the flow until peak discharge. No detailed reference information, and therefore no 1349 
bases for evaluating the simulation, is available for the flow tail. 1350 
 1351 
The transformation from a rock and ice avalanche into a debris flow was a complex process, 1352 
the simulation of which had to rely on some simplifications and assumptions. In the 1353 
simulation shown in Fig. 4, at t=480 s, the front of the debris flow had escaped far down 1354 
Rishiganga. The simulated rock and ice avalanche had reached the observed deposit at and 1355 
downstream from the Ronti Gad-Rishiganga confluence, and had largely come to rest 1356 
according to visual inspection of the results. In order to avoid further diffusion (which would 1357 
be the result of the numerical scheme used in the model rather than of the physical processes), 1358 
the avalanche is deposited at this point in time, but fluid and ice continue to flow out of the 1359 
frontal portion of the deposit together with an amount of rock equalling the amount of fluid, in 1360 
this way representing a uniform debris flow tail. 1361 
 1362 
Preliminary tests have shown that most observed features could be reproduced at a simulation 1363 
cell size of 20 m down to the lower Rishiganga valley, whereas a cell size of 10 m was 1364 
necessary to reproduce the flow characteristics from the Rishiganga – Dhauliganga confluence 1365 
downstream. In order to optimize computational efficiency, the simulation was split into two 1366 
parts: the first part (20 m cell size) focusing on the domain down to the lower part of 1367 
Rishiganga, and the second part (10 m cell size) on the area downstream. The output 1368 
hydrograph from the first part of the simulation at P1 is directly used as the input hydrograph 1369 
for the second simulation. 1370 
 1371 
The simulated process time included the first 1300 s following the release of the initial rock 1372 
and ice avalanche for the first part, and 2100 s from the onset of discharge at P1 for the 1373 
second part. Peak discharges represent the maximum simulated within 20s time steps (P1 and 1374 
P2 from the first part, P3 and P4 from the second part of the simulation). Travel times refer to 1375 
times at which 10% of the peak discharge at a given hydrograph profile has been reached. The 1376 
evolution of volume fractions and velocities shown in Fig. 4C are smoothed based on moving 1377 
averages. 1378 
 1379 
5.5 Sources of water and energy balance modeling 1380 
We estimate that the initial detachment had a total volume of 26.7 Mm3, composed of 21.2 1381 
Mm3 rock and 5.5 Mm3 ice, and thus a volumetric ratio of 79.4:20.6 (rounded to 80:20 1382 
elsewhere). We considered, but then rejected, possible additional sources of liquid water that 1383 
would have contributed significantly to the volume of the debris flow: (1) An outburst flood 1384 
from a subglacial lake at either Nanda Devi Glacier or Ronti (aka Raunthi) Glacier, as had 1385 
been suggested for several days following the event. (Satellite imagery shows no change at the 1386 
terminus of either glacier that would indicate a subglacial flood; furthermore, there is no 1387 
plausible mechanism whereby a glacier lake outburst flood could have occurred at the same 1388 
time as the detachment.) (2) A surface lake in the Rishiganga or Ronti Gad valleys. (Satellite 1389 
images available up to about 24 h before the event showed no such lake.) (3) A lake in the 1390 
valley beneath avalanched ice masses. (Ice from 2016 and earlier avalanches had melted 1391 
completely by 2019, leaving no lakes.) (4) An ice-covered lake within or beneath the 1392 
collapsed glacier. (The steepness of the detached ice precludes the presence of a lake.) (5) A 1393 
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possible enlithic lake in the crack that developed in the years preceding failure. (Any 1394 
meltwater entering this crack would have quickly frozen.) (6) Enlithic reservoirs in bedrock 1395 
caverns that may have emptied when the avalanche occurred. (In any case, enlithic reservoirs 1396 
could not account for the millions of m3 of water involved in the mass flow.) (7) A precursor 1397 
ice avalanche that deposited ice in the valley in the hours preceding the main detachment. 1398 
(Only a small volume of water would be produced in a few hours of melting and the seismic 1399 
signals indicate no major precursory avalanche.) 1400 
 1401 
One additional potential source of water within the initial rock and ice avalanche is 1402 
precipitation from a slow-moving storm system that brought widespread snowfall to the 1403 
region in the days before the event and then was followed by an abrupt increase in 1404 
temperature on the day of the failure. A weather warning was issued for Uttarakhand by the 1405 
India Meteorological Department on February 1, 2021, predicting rain, snow, and isolated 1406 
thunderstorms for February 4 and 5. The snow cover map generated from a Sentinel-2 image 1407 
acquired on February 5 shows snow down to 2200 m on February 5 (e.g. 123). Total 1408 
precipitation estimates for the period February 4-6 differ widely, with local stations showing 1409 
cumulative amounts of 8.5 and 14.5 mm at 1800 and 2800 m asl, respectively, and Weather 1410 
Research and Forecasting Model outputs suggesting amounts of ~48 mm. On the day of the 1411 
failure, both ERA5 and local weather stations show a temperature increase of about 12°C, 1412 
with station data suggesting that warming may have been more pronounced at higher 1413 
elevations due to a temperature inversion affecting the valleys. However, temperatures at the 1414 
failure zone are estimated to have remained below freezing on the day of the failure (highs 1415 
between -0.5 to -9°C depending on data source). On February 10, Sentinel-2 data indicate that 1416 
the snow cover area was reduced by ~50% on south-facing slopes and by ~30% on north-1417 
facing slopes.  1418 
 1419 
We estimate the potential total volume of water in the Ronti Gad valley contributed by this 1420 
storm system by summing the modeled liquid precipitation and melt of snow using data from 1421 
the Weather Research and Forecasting Model and two local automated weather stations. We 1422 
make the simplifying assumptions that all precipitation falling at temperatures above 0 °C is 1423 
instantaneously routed to runoff and that snow melt occurring after deposition (calculated 1424 
from the solid precipitation amount using a degree-day factor at hourly time resolution and 1425 
temperature lapse rates ranging from -4 °C km-1 and -6 °C km-1) is similarly routed. The 1426 
assumption of instantaneous routing provides a likely upper limit to the amount of water the 1427 
storm system might have contributed to the event. 1428 
 1429 
Total cumulative precipitation and snowmelt amounts derived from these calculations suggest 1430 
that the available water volume did not exceed ~220,000 – 360,000 m3 (fig. S13), depending 1431 
on the lapse rate. We note that although the median lapse rate calculated over the seven days 1432 
prior to the event using data from the nearest two stations is -5 °C km-1, a temperature 1433 
inversion observed in the region on the day of the event increases the uncertainty of 1434 
temperature extrapolations. However, given that the calculated total volume of runoff is just 1435 
4-7% of the ~5x106 m3 water equivalent contained within the ice of the initial detachment, it 1436 
is unlikely that precipitation from the storm system was a major source of the large volume of 1437 
water necessary to sustain flow of the rock/ice/water mixture, regardless of any role weather 1438 




Water already present in the river, ejected from groundwater, melting snow, wet sediment, 1441 
and water released from the run-of-the-river hydroelectric project may have all contributed 1442 
water to the debris flow. Taken together, even with generous margins of error, these sum to a 1443 
small amount compared to the probable range of water volumes in the mass movement. We 1444 
do not see mechanisms whereby liquid water was a key component of the initial detachment 1445 
or where large quantities of water already in the valley could have been ingested. 1446 
         1447 
The melting of glacier ice during the collapse and flow is thus the only known and likely 1448 
major source of water. Under certain likely conditions it could explain the volume of the 1449 
observed debris flow, even with only minor contributions from other water sources. This 1450 
mechanism is a matter of energy accounting (fig. S14), including evaluation of the 1451 
partitioning of heat transfer. 1452 
         1453 
The gravitational potential energy of the detached rock and ice, plus any mass picked up along 1454 
the descent route, provides all of the energy for: the movement, acoustic emissions 1455 
(infrasound, auditory, and seismic), rock and grain fracturing, heating, and melting of ice and 1456 
heat retention in the rock. The heating and melting energy is commonly referred to as 1457 
“frictional,” but it is more than slabs sliding against each other; it includes grain sliding and 1458 
also dissipation of other energies, such as that due to particle impacts, straining and breaking 1459 
of rock and ice, viscous dissipation in fluids (whether water or air), and emission and 1460 
reabsorption of acoustic energy. The kinetic movement is not in itself a final sink of energy; 1461 
rather, kinetic energy is the intermediary by which grain fracturing and heating are achieved 1462 
by the dissipative processes. 1463 
 1464 
We examine the potential energy released during the event, and whether this energy is 1465 
sufficient to explain the observed water volumes, using a simple calculation. The gravitational 1466 
potential energy of an object with mass m that is lowered by a distance  will liberate 1467 
potential energy in the amount , where g = 9.8 m s-1 is the acceleration due to 1468 
gravity. As noted above, it is the potential energy that powers all of the processes associated 1469 
with the mass movement. Here we assume that only a fraction  of the available potential 1470 
energy acts to first warm the ice (and a portion of the initial rock volume, as explained below) 1471 
to the melting point and, subsequently, to melt the ice; for clarity, we call this the “melt 1472 
partition” of the potential energy, even though it is first applied to warming the ice and a 1473 
portion of the rock to the ice melting point. The remaining portion  represents the portion 1474 
of the potential energy that goes towards all other flow-related processes. Assuming that the 1475 
detached mass has volume V, a rock fraction of , and ice fraction of , rock 1476 
and ice densities of = 2600 kg m-3 (appropriate for gneiss) and = 900 kg m-3, 1477 
respectively, the melt partition of potential energy is 1478 
 1479 
   (4) 1480 
 1481 
We assume that only a fraction  of the original detachment’s rock volume is required to 1482 
warm up from an assumed initial temperature of about -8°C (the average of the 1980-2020 1483 
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all of the ice must also warm by the same C before melting commences. The amount 1485 
of energy  required to warm a mass m by an amount  is proportional to the specific 1486 
heat capacity C of the material; mean values for the specific heat capacities of gneiss and ice 1487 
over the temperature range -8°C to 0°C are, respectively,  J kg-1 K-1 and  1488 
J kg-1 K-1. The energy needed to warm up the respective volumes of rock and ice are 1489 
     (5) 1490 
    (6) 1491 
 1492 
Once the initial detached rock and ice is warmed to 0°C, all additional potential energy added 1493 
to the melt partition goes towards melting ice. The energy required to melt the ice volume is 1494 
     (7) 1495 
  1496 
where  J kg-1 is the enthalpy of fusion for ice. It is worth noting that because 1497 
the specific heat capacities of rock and ice are much smaller than the enthalpy of fusion for 1498 
ice, the amount of energy needed to warm rock and ice to the melting point is only a small 1499 
fraction of that needed to melt the ice. 1500 
 1501 
From equations 4-7, we can calculate the fraction of ice melted as . For 1502 
an elevation change of m (the mean fall distance between the site of initial 1503 
detachment and the Rishiganga hydropower project), , and , >99% of the 1504 
initial ice mass would be melted by the release of potential energy. These calculations suggest 1505 
even accounting for processes powered by the release of potential energy that do not result in 1506 
ice melt, sufficient potential energy was liberated in the event to melt most of the ~5 Mm3 of 1507 
ice before it reached the site of the Rishiganga hydropower installation. 1508 
 1509 
It is worth stressing that the two key factors that allowed the major portion of the ice to melt 1510 
were (1) the particular 80:20 rock:ice ratio of the detachment and (2) the large elevation drop. 1511 
Because rock is significantly denser than ice, falling rock liberates more potential energy than 1512 
does an equal volume of falling ice. Neglecting the energy consumed by warming the rock 1513 
and ice to 0°C (~7% of the energy used in melting ice in the above calculations), we can 1514 
determine the rock fraction  that melts the greatest ice content depending on a mean fall 1515 
height  by combining equations 4 and 7: 1516 
 1517 
      (8) 1518 
 1519 
Figure S14 shows how this worst-case rock fraction differs as a function of elevation drop for 1520 
melt partition values of  and . It can be seen from this figure that the ~80:20 1521 
mixture of rock and ice that is thought to have made up the initial detachment is very close to 1522 
the worst-case scenario for an elevation change of m. Worst-case rock fraction 1523 
values calculated for this elevation change are  for  and  for 1524 
ΔT = +8°
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, values that are close to our estimate for this event. We note that a 80:20 mixture is 1525 
also typical of debris flows, and thus represents a highly mobile flow. 1526 
 1527 
The availability and generation of water through frictional melting of ice and snow, existing 1528 
subaerial and subsurface water bodies or saturated sediment, play a critical role in the 1529 
potential of an event to extend the risk to downstream populations and assets. However, even 1530 
post-disaster analysis can be challenged by uncertainties in identifying the sources and the 1531 
role of water. In this case, the major source of the water seems clear. Observations suggest 1532 
that the initial detachment contained 5.5 Mm3 of ice, mixed with an additional 21.2 Mm3 of 1533 
rock. The simple potential energy model described in equations 4-8 suggests that the potential 1534 
energy released during the descent of the detached rock/ice mass was sufficient to largely melt 1535 
the volume of ice within the first 10-15 km of its flow, provided that the major part of the 1536 
released potential energy was consumed by melting the ice and that the melt proceeded 1537 
rapidly due to the violence of the event. Although additional sources of water might have 1538 
contributed to the debris flow, they are not necessary to explain the observed event. Our 1539 
analysis suggests that the mixture of rock and ice in the initial detachment, when combined 1540 
with the vertical distance it fell, place this event close to a worst-case scenario, maximizing 1541 






Fig. S1. Historical climate trends. (A) Long-term mean annual cycle of near surface air 1545 
temperature at the location of the failure as compared to the year 2020 from downscaled 1546 
ERA5 data using the TopoSCALE scheme (73). (B) Local mean annual air temperature 1547 
(MAAT) at the elevation of the failure and (C) Temperature deviations from the long-term 1548 
mean at an automated weather station at Mukteswar, Kumaon, about 100 km south of Ronti 1549 
Peak. Data from NOAA Global Historical Climatology Network. 1550 
(https://data.giss.nasa.gov/cgi-1551 
bin/gistemp/stdata_show_v4.cgi?id=IN023420800&dt=1&ds=14)  1552 
Long-term temperature trend at Mukteswar Kumaon, India
























































































Fig. S2. Landsat 7 (1999-2000) and Sentinel-2 (2016) images showing the ice avalanches 1554 
sourced on the hanging glacier west of the failure zone.   1555 
0 0.5 1km 0 0.5 1km 0 0.5 1km 0 0.5 1km




Fig. S3. Satellite-derived elevation change of the source area. (A) Elevation change in the 1557 
source area of the 2016 avalanche based on differences in DEMs between September 2015 1558 
and December 24, 2018. Background image is a hillshade view of the September 2015 DEM. 1559 
(B) Elevation change in the source area of the 2021 ice-rock avalanche based on differences 1560 
between the December 24, 2018, and February 10-11, 2021 DEM. Background image is a 1561 
hillshade view of the February 2021 DEM. (C-D) Topographic profiles of locations shown in 1562 




Fig. S4. Satellite-derived analysis of precursory motion. (A,B) Time series of slope 1565 
movement; the red line is the monthly mean velocity (see (D) for locations). (C) August 2018 1566 
velocity anomaly (08/2018 velocity minus the 2015-2021 median monthly velocity), 1567 
highlighting the rapid slip in the collapse area. (D) The growing crack in a 01/31/2021 1568 




Fig. S5. High-resolution orthoimages over source area. Image sequence includes 1571 
Maxar/DigitalGlobe WorldView-1/2 (PAN, 0.5 m), ISRO/NRSC CartoSat-1 (PAN, 2.5 m), 1572 
Planet Dove Classic (NIR, ~3-4 m) and CNES/Airbus Pleiades-HR (PAN, 0.5 m) imagery. 1573 
See Table S2 for more details. All images except September 10, 2015 were enhanced using a 1574 
Contrast Limited Adaptive Histogram Equalisation (CLAHE) algorithm implemented in the 1575 
scikit-image package v0.17.1 (105; clip limit 0.05, kernel size of 500 px for <1 m GSD imagery, 1576 
125 px for others) to bring out detail over both light (e.g., ice/snow) and dark (e.g., exposed 1577 
rock) surfaces. The large fracture associated with the February 7, 2021 event is apparent in the 1578 
October 19, 2017 image, with increased width in the November 1, 2018 image. Limited 1579 
expansion is observed in subsequent images. The 2021 images show stratigraphy exposed in 1580 
the west wall of the scar, and deposits from small rockfall events following the large February 1581 
7, 2021 collapse. These orthoimages were derived from Level-1B imagery that is © 1582 
Maxar/Digitalglobe, Inc. (NGA NextView License), ISRO/NRSC, Planet Labs, Inc., and 1583 
CNES/Airbus DS. Pre-event images were orthorectified using the September 2015 DEM 1584 
Composite (60), post-event images were orthorectified using the February 2021 DEM 1585 
Composite (61). 1586 




Fig. S6. Seismic signals generated by the Chamoli avalanche and subsequent debris flow 1589 
(A), recorded at stations BAYN and GHAN (located on E). The signal envelope and the 1590 
spectrogram are shown in (B) and (C). (D) shows an enlargement of (A) for the onset of the 1591 
seismic signal, highlighting the impulsive signal attributed to the detachment of the rockslide. 1592 
Arrows on (A) and (B) indicate the times of the detachment signal and impacts on the 1593 
northeastern flank of the valley. (E) shows locations of stations BAYN and GHAN relative to 1594 




Fig. S7. Histogram of stable bedrock DEM differences. Snow cover was higher in the post-1597 








Fig S9. Ice volume calculation using five different methods. Methods include ice velocity 1602 
inversion (black histogram) and Farinotti et al. (118) methods 1-4 (labelled F1-F4). The mean 1603 




Fig. S10. Volume of different components. (A) Total collapse volume, (B) total ice volume, 1606 




Fig. S11. Four sites used to estimate mean flow front velocity and discharge along the 1609 




Fig. S12. Reference information, initial conditions and zones of model parameters used 1612 




Fig. S13: Results from water production modeling. (A) Temperatures extrapolated from the 1615 
automated weather station (AWS) at Auli (2900 m asl, 30.5283°N, 79.5619E°) using a lapse 1616 
rate of -5°C km-1 (median lapse rate of seven days prior to the event). (B) Hourly water 1617 
production estimated by summing rain and snowmelt (degree day factor of 6 mm °C-1 d-1). (C) 1618 
Cumulative water production at all elevations in Ronti Gad modeled with lapse rates ranging 1619 
from -4°C km-1 to -6°C km-1. The triangles indicate the upper (▼) and lower (▲) boundary of 1620 
the failure.   1621 
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Fig. S14. Rock volume fraction that would be able to melt all ice during fall as a function of 1623 
average fall distance. The vertical dashed line at 3400 m represents the mean fall distance 1624 
between the site of the initial detachment and the Rishiganga hydropower project. The vertical 1625 
dashed line indicates the initial rock volume fraction of the detachment of about 0.8. The 1626 
Chamoli rock and ice avalanche had a combination of rock-ice fraction and fall distance that 1627 
enabled most ice to be melted and to transform into a debris flow (orange area). For a 1628 
significantly higher rock fraction (depending on fall distance), not the entire mass can 1629 
transform into a debris flow (endmember: rock avalanche), for a significantly lower rock 1630 
fraction not enough water is melted for this transformation (endmember: ice avalanche).   1631 
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Fig. S15. Ground-level and helicopter photographs by Amit Kumar/Wadi and M. 1633 
Farooq Azam. (A) View up Ronti Gad at the landslide source and upper flow path. Blue and 1634 
red lines are the mass flow trimlines and splash zones identified in Fig 2. (B) View up Ronti 1635 
Gad showing mass flow trimlines. (C) View upstream to the confluence of Dhauliganga and 1636 
Rishiganga rivers with many transported trees (circled in green). (D) View upstream of the 1637 
destroyed Tapovan hydropower project. (E) View of new iron bridge over Rishiganga River 1638 
(operational since March 5, 2021) and flood EWS (30o29’00.256” N 79o41’46.886” E, 1947 1639 
m asl).  1640 
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  1641 
 1642 
Fig. S16. Longitudinal profiles of elevation (A) and volume (B) changes from pre-event 1643 
(2015) and post-event (2021) DEMs. Changes are calculated within a 500 m-wide swath 1644 
within the upper 6 km of the flow travel path. For distances beyond this, volume and elevation 1645 
changes are calculated within 200 and 40 m-wide swaths, respectively. Color ramp shows 1646 
average normalized median absolute deviation (NMAD, units of meters) of valid elevation 1647 
difference values within each swath. This metric captures actual elevation change variability 1648 




Fig. S17. Mass flow trimlines mapped from satellite imagery and DEMs. (A) Elevations 1651 
of trimlines and river profile. (B) Elevation of trimlines above valley bottom with river 1652 
planform curvature. River planform curvature at a given point along the river describes the 1653 
curvature of the approximating circle at that point. Negative and positive values indicate right 1654 
and left turns, respectively. Higher absolute values denote a sharper planform bend of the 1655 
river.  1656 
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Table S1. Homes of the dead/missing (Source: (124)) 1657 
 Indian State/Union Territory & Nepal No. of people missing/dead 
1 Uttarakhand 72 
2 Uttar Pradesh 65 
3 Jharkhand 13 
4 Nepal 11 
5 Bihar 9 
6 Himachal Pradesh 9 
7 Punjab 6 
8 West Bengal 6 
9 Madhya Pradesh 4 
10 Assam 3 
11 Delhi 1 
12 Odisha 2 
13 Haryana 1 
14 Jammu and Kashmir 1 
15 Unknown (N/A) 1 
 TOTAL 204 
  1658 
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Table S2. List of high-resolution satellite images used for geomorphic mapping and 1659 
DEM production. 1660 
Pre-event 
Source Resolution (m) Date 
ESRI BaseMap (RBG) 0.5 September 26, 2014 
October 12, 2014 
December 21, 2018 
SPOT7 (PAN, 4-band MS) 1.5 (6) October 12, 2014 (tri-stereo) 
December 24, 2018 (stereo) 
WorldView-1 (PAN) 0.5 September 1, 2015 (2) 
September 10, 2015 
September 14, 2015 (2) 
October 1, 2015 (2) 
October 5, 2015 (2) 
WorldView-2 (PAN, 8-band MS) 0.5 September 28, 2015 (2) 
September 9, 2018 
December 22, 2018 
CartoSat-1 (PAN) 2.5 October 19, 2017 (stereo) 
November 1, 2018 (stereo) 
GeoEye-1 (4-band MS) 0.5 April 28, 2019 
PlanetScope (4-band MS) 3 November 21, 2019 
December 31, 2020 
February 6, 2021 
During event 
PlanetScope (4-band MS) 3 February 7, 2021 
Post-event 
PlanetScope (4-band MS) 3 February 8, 2021 
WorldView-1 (PAN) 0.5 February 9, 2021 (mostly cloudy) 
Pleiades-HR (PAN, 4-band MS) 0.5 (2.0) February 9, 2021 
February 10, 2021 (stereo) 
SkySat-C (PAN, 4-band MS) 0.5-0.7 February 9, 2021 (stereo) 
February 10, 2021 
February 19, 2021 
GeoEye-1 (PAN, 4-band MS) 0.5 (2.0) February 10, 2021 (2) 
WorldView-3 (PAN, 8-band MS) 0.3 (1.2) February 10, 2021 
WorldView-2 (PAN, 8-band MS) 0.5 (2.0) February 11, 2021 (2) 
February 19, 2021 
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Table S3. Characteristics of the avalanche seismic signal at the 2 stations GHAN and 1661 
BAYN 1662 
  Distance to the source 
(km) 
Arrival time of the 
first wave (UTC) 
Duration (s) 
GHAN 159.3 04:51:38.8 855 
BAYN 174.3 04:51:43.8 895.8 
  1663 
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P1 14.3 km 1260 51 24.7 318.75 to 525.50 8,191 to 14,199 10:30-10:32# 
P2 16.7 km 330 13 25.3 281.25 to 487.50 7,116 to 12,334 10:31-10:33# 
P3 23.6 km 540 34 15.9 300.00 to 528.00 4,770 to 8,411 10:38-10:40      
P4 25.7 km 70 6 11.7 243.75 to 422.50 2,852 to 4,943 10:41-10:42# 
*Notes: Approximated from idealized trapezoidal cross-profile with different slope steepness and flow depth. 1667 
** Q calculated as the product of mean velocity and cross-profile area (Q = v*A). 1668 
# Values calculated from known onset of the flow front at Tapovan dam (site P3) and estimated mean flow-front 1669 
velocities. 1670 
 1671 
